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Recorded remittances to Africa have grown dramatically 
over the past decade. Yet data limitations still mean 
relatively little is known about which migrants remit, 
how much they remit, and how their remitting 
behavior varies with gender, education, income levels, 
and duration abroad. This paper constructs the most 
comprehensive remittance database on immigrants in 
the OECD currently available, containing microdata 
on more than 12,000 African immigrants. Using this 
microdata the authors establish several basic facts about 
the remitting patterns of Africans, and then explore how 
key characteristics of policy interest relate to remittance 
behavior. Africans are found to remit twice as much on 
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average as migrants from other developing countries, 
and those from poorer African countries are more likely 
to remit than those from richer African countries. Male 
migrants remit more than female migrants, particularly 
among those with a spouse remaining in the home 
country; more-educated migrants remit more than less 
educated migrants; and although the amount remitted 
increases with income earned, the gradient is quite 
flat over a large range of income. Finally, there is little 
evidence that the amount remitted decays with time 
spent abroad, with reductions in the likelihood of 
remitting offset by increases in the amount remitted 
conditional on remitting. 
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1.  Introduction 
Recorded remittances to Africa have dramatically increased over the past decade, 
with remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa increasing five-fold from US$4 billion in 2002 to 
$20 billion in 2008 (Sander and Maimbo, 2002; Ratha et al, 2009). While much of this 
improvement likely reflects improvements in measurement and a shift towards more 
formal remittance channels, actual flows are still believed to notably exceed this recorded 
amount. Although 70 percent of Sub-Saharan migrants are believed to migrate to other 
countries in the region (Ratha and Shaw, 2007), remittance flows are believed to be 
dominated by flows from outside the region. For example, one estimate suggests that 
slightly less than three-quarters of all remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa were sent from 
the United States and Western Europe.
1 
Yet despite the increasing attention being given to remittances in international 
policy circles as a result of this rapid growth, the poor quality of existing data has limited 
what is known about the characteristics of these remitters. There are a few studies which 
have looked at the determinants and consequences of receiving remittances based on 
surveys fielded in the source countries (see Azam and Gubert, 2006 and Shaw, 2007 for 
recent reviews), while Gupta et al. (2007) examine the same issues from a macro 
perspective. Even fewer studies have occurred from the sending side, and those that do 
exist focus on a single destination country (e.g. Miotti et al, 2009) and often on a single 
source country migrant group (e.g. Osili, 2007). As a result, currently there is nothing 
that can examine in a systematic way which African migrants remit and which don’t, and 
how much they send, yet alone answer key questions of interest to policymakers such as 
whether the more educated remit less or whether women remit more. 
This paper aims to address this information gap by providing a detailed look at the 
remitting behavior of African migrants in the OECD. We focus on the OECD both 
because of data availability and because this is the source of the majority of remittances. 
We put together a new database on immigrants and use this to consider remittances of 
over 12,000 Sub-Saharan and North African migrants in nine OECD destination 
countries. Only one-third of the migrants in our sample remit, with those remitting 
                                                        
1 See World Bank estimates cited in http://allafrica.com/stories/200811111001.html [accessed August 8, 
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sending an average of $US2,638 annually – a sizeable amount relative to Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s GNI per capita of $1082.
2  Compared to other developing country immigrants in 
the OECD we find African migrants to be both more likely to remit, and to remit more. 
Within Africa we find a strong negative association between the likelihood of remitting 
and country income. 
We use this microdata to explore the determinants of remitting as a function of 
individual characteristics which theory suggests should matter. We focus in on four areas 
of particular interest to recent policy debates. The first is gender. There has been an 
increasing feminization of global migration flows, and there is often a belief that women 
are better and more reliable remitters. For example, Lindley (2007, p. 12) remarks that in 
Somali communities it is sometimes said that “women are ‘better’ remitters than men 
(even that it is better to have one daughter abroad than ten sons)”, although in practice 
she finds Somali men to remit more. We find for Africans as a group that female 
migrants are less likely to be remitting, and that men remit more than women when they 
do remit. This is particularly the case when comparing individuals with a spouse 
remaining at home – men with a spouse outside the country remit $US3,879 more per 
year than women with a spouse remaining at home.  
Second and third, we focus on the roles of education and income. The issue of 
brain drain is always quick to arise when discussing migration out of Africa. From the 
remittances standpoint, there is a fear that more-educated migrants will send less 
remittances, perhaps because they have less intention to return, and are more likely to 
move their whole families with them. With this same database, we have recently shown 
that for developing country emigrants as a whole, more educated migrants in fact remit 
more (Bollard et al, 2009). We find here, if anything, this relationship is stronger when 
we just consider African emigrants. Furthermore, we show there is a strong non-linearity 
among African migrants, with the amount remitted relatively constant with respect to 
education until completion of high school, and then strongly rising with education 
thereafter. Similarly, we find a strong positive association between income earned abroad 
and amount remitted, with this relationship quite flat over middle ranges of income and 
                                                        
2 Source: World Bank Gross National Income per capita. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf 4 
 
steeper at the tails. These findings suggest that from a remittances viewpoint, African 
countries have more to gain from promoting migration for skilled work than for less 
skilled migration. 
Finally, there is now a growing literature which asks whether remittances decay 
with time spent abroad (e.g. Brown, 1997; Simati and Gibson, 2001; Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo, 2006; Miotti et al., 2009). This issue enters the policy debate over discussions 
as to whether temporary or longer-term migration episodes have greater development 
impact. There is a concern that as individuals spend more time abroad they will lose ties 
with their home countries, and remittances will fall. In contrast, we find that the 
likelihood of remitting and amount remitted increase over the first five to ten years of 
migration. While the likelihood of remitting begins to fall after 20 or so years, we have 
little data for such migrants, and the data we do have suggest that the total amount 
remitted doesn’t fall since migrants who have been abroad longer will remit more on the 
occasions they do remit.   
2.  Data 
Few surveys in OECD countries collect data on remittances. Data on the number 
and characteristics of immigrants from different countries can be readily obtained from 
Census microdata and labor force surveys. However, neither contains information on 
remittances. Instead one must rely on special purpose surveys of immigrants. With an 
intensive effort we have combined together all the publicly available datasets we are 
aware of, as well as obtained access to a number of non-publicly available datasets which 
have been graciously shared by the researchers or sponsoring organizations. The resulting 
database comprises information on more than 12,000 African immigrants from 11 
surveys in 9 OECD countries (Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, United Kingdom and United States). The surveys cover a wide range of 
populations, covering both nationally representative surveys of recent immigrants (the 
New Immigrant Survey (NIS) in the U.S., the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in 
Australia (LSIA),  and the DREES survey in France), nationally representative surveys of 
all immigrants (the Spanish National Survey of Immigrants (ENI)), and surveys which 
attempt to sample migrants from particular countries (the NiDi surveys in Spain and Italy, 5 
 
the International Remittance Senders Household Survey of migrants from Senegal, 
Nigeria, and Congo in Belgium, the France 2MO survey, the Black/Minority Ethnic 
Survey (BME) in the United Kingdom, the Living Conditions of Immigrants (LKI) 
survey in Norway, and the CSR survey in the Netherlands).  
A detailed data appendix provides a full description of the details of each survey, 
including its sampling methodology, the phrasing of the questions used to measure 
remittances, other variable definitions, and summary statistics per survey and sending 
country.  
The database we have constructed is the most comprehensive microdata on 
African remitting patterns in the OECD currently available. Combining the different 
datasets offers the potential to at least provide an informed description of remitting 
patterns and how they vary with key covariates of interest. However, the obvious 
question which then arises is whether we can usefully pool and analyze data collected 
with different survey methodologies in different countries. We address this issue in two 
ways. First, all of our empirical analysis will include survey fixed effects, therefore 
controlling for any level differences arising from particular surveys. Second, we test the 
sensitivity of our main descriptive results to which surveys we pool together. 
  The use of destination country data is crucial for answering the questions of 
interest to this study. Surveys in African countries can tell us which households have a 
migrant, and which receive remittances, but cannot inform us about which migrants have 
moved abroad with their whole household and whether they send remittances or not. 
Asking household members in sending countries to report on the incomes, education and 
other characteristics of the migrant members abroad is also infrequently done, and subject 
to substantial problems of household members not being able to report such information.  
For each dataset we construct comparable covariates to measure household 
income, remittance behavior, family composition, and demographic characteristics, 
measured at the individual level of the survey respondent. Remittances and income are 
typically measured at the household level, not the individual level.  All financial values 
are reported in constant 2003 $US.  In addition, we drop any observations where reported 
annual remittances are more than twice annual household income. For each survey we 
utilize survey weights if provided with the data. We also present pooled results using 6 
 
weights post-stratified by country of birth and education to match the cross-sectional 
distribution of African migrants to OECD countries in the year 2000.   
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of African migrants in each of our 
datasets. We present summary statistics for each of our surveys, as well as the pooled 
sample. Concentrating on the pooled data in the final column, a typical migrant is a 36 
year-old male who has completed high school and has an annual household income of 
$26,000. However, there is considerable heterogeneity between the datasets. One-third of 
the pooled sample has completed an undergraduate university degree, but this ranges 
from 53% in the Belgian IRSHS survey to 3% in the Spain NIDI survey. The average 
years spent abroad over the whole sample is 9.4 years, ranging from a low of 3.6 years in 
the Australian data (which is a survey of recent immigrants) to 18.2 years in the French 
2MO survey, which surveys remittance senders at French post offices. Family 
characteristics, especially family members living away from the migrant, are an 
important determinant for understanding remittance behavior. In our database 64% of 
migrants on average are married, and 10% of migrants on average have a spouse outside 
the country.  
3. The incidence and level of remitting by African migrants 
We start with establishing the prevalence and the pattern of remittances by the 
migrants in our database. We consider two key dimensions of remittance behavior. 
Firstly, whether migrants choose to remit at all or not (the extensive margin), and 
secondly the total amount remitted (including as zero those who did not remit anything). 
There is considerable variation among the different surveys in sampling methodology, 
and target population, as well as differences arising from the self-selection of immigrants 
moving to different countries and in the income-earning opportunities they face once they 
arrive there. It is therefore useful to begin by illustrating the differences in the incidence 
of remitting and amount remitting by survey, which is done in Figures 1 and 2. 
Figure 1 shows the extensive margin. There is substantial variability between the 
different surveys: for example, over 80% of migrants in the Belgium IRSHS survey 
remit, while only 20% of migrants in the French DREES survey remit. Figure 2 
summarizes total remittances sent by migrants in each destination country. Total 7 
 
remittances are a composite of the number of migrants who choose to remit, and the 
amount remitted by those who send back some money.  The total remitted ranges from 
$227 in the Australian LSIA survey of new immigrants to $3089 in the Spanish NIDI 
survey which surveyed Moroccans and Senegalese through a combination of geographic 
targeting and referrals. Because of the differences in survey methodology and target 
population across countries, neither figure should be used to make statements of the 
nature “Africans in country X remit more than Africans in country Y”. Rather the 
purpose of showing these figures is to give the reader a sense of the range in variation 
across destination country samples, and so that this heterogeneity can be kept in mind 
when examining differences across origin countries. 
  We next summarize remitting patterns by country of origin. For the pooled 
African sample as a whole, we find one-third of migrant households in the OECD 
remitting, with the mean (median) amount remitted conditional on remitting equal to 
US$2,638 (US$1,088) annually. Combining the extensive and intensive margins gives a 
mean annual amount remitted of US$1,263, twice as large as the value for the rest of the 
developing world’s migrants (US$668). Table 2 shows in more detail the distribution of 
the amount remitted for Sub-Saharans, North Africans, and the rest of the developing 
world.
3 We see few migrants remit amounts of $5,000 or more annually – 5 percent of 
Sub-Saharans and 7 percent of North Africans, while 80 percent of Sub-Saharan migrants 














The large differences across surveys in both the fraction of migrants who remit 
and the average total remittances across surveys suggest caution in interpreting any raw 
statistics from the pooled dataset of all surveys, given that each survey focused on 
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sampling different nationalities and sub-populations of African migrants. With these 
caveats in mind, Figures 3 and 5 present statistics on remitting by country within Africa 
for the pooled dataset, and then later in the paper we explore whether any differences 
observed across source countries remain significant after controlling for survey dataset 
fixed effects and the effects of observable characteristics of the migrants.  We present 
statistics for each African country that has 30 or more observations for the remittance 
measure being studied.
4  
Figure 3 shows the fraction of migrants who remitted money in the past year 
(extensive margin) by country of birth, including a comparison of African migrants 
compared with migrants from other developing countries (rest of world) in our database.  
There are large differences in remitting patterns across countries in the raw data. More 
than 70% of migrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Senegal remitted 
money, while fewer than 20% of migrants from Algeria, Mauritius and South Africa 
remitted anything. 
  Examining the differences across countries in Figure 3 suggests that emigrants 
from poorer African countries are more likely to remit than emigrants from richer African 
countries. However, one concern is whether these differences are all driven by 
differences in the destination countries these migrants are located in. To test this, we 
regress the proportion remitting on destination survey fixed effects to remove this source 
of variation, and then graph the residual variation against GDP per capita (expressed in 
PPP terms from the Penn World Tables) in Figure 4. We see that there is a strong and 
significant negative slope: for each doubling in GDP per capita, the fraction of migrants 
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Figure 5 completes the descriptive figures by showing differences in mean total 
amount remitted in the past year by source country. This incorporates those who remit 
zero. There is also considerable heterogeneity in the raw data across countries in the 
amount remitted. Migrants from Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal each sent home more than 





4. Which characteristics explain the remitting behavior of Africans? 
  The differences observed in the raw data reflect differences in which destination 
country surveys emigrants from different origin countries are in, as well as differences in 
the characteristics of the emigrants from different countries. We therefore next examine 
whether these country of origin differences persist once we control for these other factors, 
as well as investigating which characteristics describe the remitting behavior of African 
migrants at the micro level. To do this we estimate the following regression for individual 
i from country j now living in country k: 
Remitting Behaviori,j,k = α + β’Xi,j,k + γ’Origini,j,k + δ’Destinationi,j,k +  εi,j,k 
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Here remitting behavior is measured in three ways – as total remittances which includes 
zero for those who do not remit, as a binary indicator of whether or not an individual 
remits (the extensive margin), and as log of the amount remitted for those who remit (the 
intensive margin). Our aim through these regressions is to describe the characteristics of 
this remitting behavior, and to test whether there are differences in remitting behavior 
across origin countries after controlling for destination country survey fixed effects and 
for differences in observable characteristics across individuals. 
  There is now a rich theoretical literature which describes a variety of different 
reasons individuals remit (see Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). Our choice of which 
individual characteristics to control for is motivated by these theories, but it should be 
noted that our intent is not to test which of these theories best describes the remitting 
behavior of Africans, but merely to use these theories to help understand which 
characteristics might be associated with remitting behavior. The comprehensive dataset 
we have constructed contains a number of variables of interest, but is lacking in several 
key variables that would be needed to adequately test different theories of why people 
remit. For example, we do not have information on the income levels of the family 
members left in the home country, or on the shocks experienced by either the migrant or 
their family. This prevents attempts to tease out whether altruism or insurance motives 
are driving the results. Likewise we know whether remittances are being made, but not 
whether they are being used to repay a loan or to invest in property, which are other 
important reasons for remitting. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the descriptive regression analysis is itself of 
interest, since many of the questions of remitting behavior in the policy arena are ones of 
a descriptive not a causal nature. Thus policymakers are interested in whether male or 
female migrants remit more or less, not whether gender has a causal impact on remitting 
behavior. Likewise, there is interest in whether high-skilled migrants (measured by either 
education or income earned) remit more or less, rather than in whether causing a migrant 
to stay in school longer would change that particular migrant’s remitting behavior. This is 
because migration policy questions generally concern who is migrating, which involves 
comparing different groups of individuals, rather than with what the effects would be of 
changing the characteristics of the same group of people who migrate. 13 
 
  With our dataset we are able to control for a number of important characteristics 
of individuals which theory suggests should be associated with remitting behavior. These 
include demographic characteristics of the migrant (age and sex), differences in 
household demographics and the presence of family abroad (marital status, household 
size in the destination country, whether or not the spouse, children, and parents of the 
interviewee are abroad), income and employment status, years of education, the length of 
time spent abroad, and some qualitative indicator of intent to return home, and legal 
status.
5  
  We use all available data in these regressions. While we in total have data on 
12,785 migrants, some of these are from surveys only at the extensive margin, and others 
only from surveys at the intensive margin. In order to account for differences in sample 
size across destination countries, we reweight the data using weights post-stratified by 
education level and country of birth. We therefore require education data to be non-
missing in these regressions. This gives a sample size of 8,953 usable observations at the 
extensive margin, 3,838 usable observations at the intensive margin, and 5,171 usable 
observations on total remittances (including zeros for those not remitting). The 
regressions in Table 3 then dummy out missing covariates in order not to reduce the 
sample further. For robustness we have also re-run Table 3 just using the 5,171 
observations that have information both on whether individuals remit and how much they 
remit, obtaining very similar results.
6  
  Table 3 presents the results of these regressions. All regressions contain dataset 
fixed effects. For each remittance measure the first column shows results excluding the 
individual characteristics, while the second adds these individual characteristics. This 
allows us to see whether differences in remittance behavior remain across source 
countries after controlling for destination dataset fixed effects, and whether these 
differences persist after also controlling for observable characteristics of these migrants. 
The coefficients on country of birth indicate whether migrants born in a given country 
remit differently from those born in Ghana. An F-test tests the null hypothesis of joint 
                                                        
5 We dummy out missing covariates, which largely occur because not all covariates are available in all 
datasets (see Table 1).  
6 Results not shown for space reasons, but available upon request. 14 
 
equality of these country fixed effects. The R
2 measures show that adding migrant 
characteristics is important for explaining more of the variation in the data. For example, 
for total remittances, the R
2 is 0.018 when we use only survey fixed effects, 0.031 when 
we add country of origin fixed effects, and 0.081 when we add migrant characteristics.  
For total remittances the first column shows we can reject equality of source 
country fixed effects, with South Africans remitting significantly less. Several other 
countries show large, but insignificant differences from Ghana. However, after 
controlling for observable characteristics of the migrants we can no longer reject equality. 
Thus the fact that South Africans remit less appears to be mostly due to differences in the 
education, income, time abroad, and family composition of South African migrants. 
When we examine the extensive margin, we see more significant differences, in part due 
to more countries having data at this margin. Even after controlling for observable 
characteristics of the migrants, we find Egyptians, South Africans and Mauritians being 
less likely to remit than Ghanaians, and migrants from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Cameroon, Mali, and Mauritania being more likely to remit. Finally, at the 
intensive margin, we see that while Egyptians are less likely to remit, they remit more 
conditional on remitting, and Ivorians remit more conditional on remitting.  
Therefore some differences do still remain in the remitting patterns of African 
migrants from different countries, even after controlling for observable characteristics of 
the migrants and the different destination countries they are located in. These differences 
might arise from differences at the migrant level in important variables we cannot 
measure – for example, we do not measure the income level or shocks being experienced 
by family members at home. Thus, if we were to compare a South African and a Malian 
earning the same amount abroad, and with similar family compositions and education 
levels, we would still expect the Malian to be more likely to remit because their family at 
home is likely to be poorer.  An alternative explanation could be that these differences in 
remitting behavior reflect country-level factors influencing remittance behavior. For 
example, if the exchange rate is temporarily undervalued, we might expect all migrants 
from a particular country to be remitting more to be taking advantage of investment 
opportunities and greater purchasing power at home. We cannot separate these two 15 
 
competing explanations for country differences, but it is notable that there are few such 
differences in total remittance behavior. 
  In terms of the covariates, the regression results are generally consistent with 
theoretical predictions. For all three measures of remittance behavior we see that 
remitting increases with household income and the respondent being employed, and with 
the presence of a spouse or child outside the destination country. The effects are both 
statistically and economically significant – a 10% increase in household income is 
associated with an additional $110 remitted each year on average, while an additional 
child outside the household is associated with remitting an additional $496 per year. A 
spouse outside the country is associated with remitting an additional $1,339 per year. 
This is not statistically significant for the total amount remitted, but is significant at both 
the extensive and intensive margins when considered separately.  
  Despite the large wage differences, many migrants return to poor countries. 
Dustmann (2003) and Yang (2006) discuss several theoretical explanations which can 
explain this. There are several theoretical reasons to believe that individuals who intend 
to return home may remit more – they may remit to build savings at home, to invest in 
social capital at home, or because they have maintained stronger ties and are therefore 
more altruistic towards those at home (Lucas and Stark, 1985). Empirically Merkle and 
Zimmermann (1992) find migrants who plan to stay longer in Germany remit less, 
Glytsos (1997) finds that Greek temporary migrants remit more than permanent migrants, 
and Brown (1997) finds Pacific Island migrants who intend to return home send more 
remittances. We are able to construct an indicator of intent for 75 percent of the 
observations in our sample. Table 3 shows this to be strongly significant at the extensive 
margin – migrants who plan to return home are more likely to remit. We also see they 
send more remittances in total, although this effect is not statistically significant. 
Legal status has a strong positive effect on the extensive margin: migrants who 
are legally in a country are approximately 12% more likely to remit. This may reflect 
differences in access available to formal financial institutions, such as banks, between 
legal and illegal migrants. Conditional on these other covariates, the respondent’s 
education, sex and age have no significant relationship with total remittances in the first 16 
 
column, although they do predict the extensive margin to some extent. The number of 
years the migrant has spent abroad is never significantly associated with any measure of 
remittances conditional on these other covariates.  
The analysis in Table 3 pools together (i) nationally representative surveys of 
recent immigrants (NIS, LSIA and DREES), (ii) a nationally representative survey of all 
immigrants (the ENI), and (iii) specific surveys of certain groups or of remitters only. To 
test the sensitivity of the associations seen in Table 3 to this pooling of data, we therefore 
also re-estimated Table 3 for each of the groupings (i), (ii) and (iii) separately. The results 
are quite robust to the choice of sample, with the sign, approximate magnitude, and 
statistical significance of the main individual characteristics generally not varying much 
over the sub-samples.
7   
4.1 Remittance patterns by gender 
  The regressions in Table 3 show the linear association of particular variables with 
remittances, conditional on other variables. We now turn to exploring four key variables 
of interest to policymakers more closely. The first is gender. The percentage of 
respondents who are female varies from only 12 percent in the Italian NiDi survey, to 49 
percent in the United States New Immigrant Survey and 51 percent in the French DREES 
survey. Table 4 summarizes the patterns of remitting by gender.  In all surveys, women 
report remitting less money on average than men in the past year, and this difference is 
statistically significant in two of the surveys.  In five of the surveys women are 
significantly less likely to remit than men. Overall, men remit an average of $568 per 
person than women (although this difference is not statistically significant).  In the pooled 
sample, only 26% of female respondents remit, which is statistically different than the 
42% of male respondents who remit. These differences appear to be largely driven by the 
differences in the observable characteristics of male and female migrants controlled for in 
Table 3, since after controlling for these characteristics males only remit $71 more and 





The second half of Table 4 examines differences in remitting patterns by gender 
for the group of migrants who migrate without their spouse. This is a more common 
occurrence for male migrants than females. Thus male migrants are 64 percent of total 
migrants in these six surveys, but are 87 percent of the migrants with a spouse outside the 
country. Among those in this category, men remit a lot more than women. Men with a 
spouse outside the country remit an average of $3,879, while women with a spouse 
outside the country remit $771, which amounts to a statistically significant difference of 
$3,108.  
It is important to emphasize that these are merely descriptive results – we can 
refute the traditional claim that women remit more than men. However, we are not 
claiming that gender alone is the reason men remit more than women. There are likely to 
be differences in who self-selects into migration between men and women, and the 
differences in observed and unobserved characteristics of men and women will then lead 
to different remitting patterns.  
4.2 Semi-parametric remittance patterns 
  The other three key relationships of interest which we wish to examine in more 
detail are the association between remittance behavior and time abroad, education, and 
income. Each of these is a continuous variable, and it is of interest to flexibly examine the 
association between remittance behavior and this characteristic, whilst still controlling for 
other important factors such as the destination country survey and other basic migrant 
characteristics. This gives a much richer view of the patterns in the data, and shows 
where the data is more informative. 
To do this, we use semi-parametric regression to estimate the partial linear model: 
y = f(x) + z’β + ε, 
where y is the remittance measure, x is the migrant characteristic of interest, f(.) is an 
unknown function and z is a vector of controls which enter linearly. We always include 
dataset fixed effects in z, and then examine how the relationship f(.) changes when we 
include further demographic controls.  To obtain consistent estimates of f(.) and β, we use 
the following procedure (Robinson 1988): 18 
 
1.  Non-parametrically regress each variable in y and z on x. 
2.  Obtain a consistent estimate of the vector of linear parameters, β, by regressing 
the first-stage residual of y on the residuals of z. 
3.  Use the second-stage estimate of β to form y – z’β, and non-parametrically regress 
this on x to estimate f(.) consistently.  
4.  Use these estimates to plot the predicted values f(x) + z’β evaluated at the means 
of z over an interval of x. 
5.  Bootstrap this procedure 500 times to obtain a 95% pointwise confidence interval 
for this relationship 
Figures 6-11 present these relationships.  The panels on the left control only for the 
datasets being used, while the panels on the right also include demographic controls, such 
as sex, marital status and a quadratic in age.  Each figure plots the estimated non-
parametric relationship between a measure of remittances and a variable of interest, 
evaluating all controls at their means, together with a 95% confidence interval.  Monetary 
values of remittances are estimated linearly, but plotted on a log scale.  The dashed 
vertical lines demarcate the quartiles (i.e. the lowest 25%, the median, and the highest 
75%) of the variable of interest. 
4.3 Remittance patterns by years spent abroad 
  As noted in the introduction, one of the key variables of policy interest is the 
length of time migrants have spent abroad. In particular, the general issue of interest is 
whether there is remittance decay. One formulation of remittance decay pertains to 
individuals, asking whether particular individuals start to remit less as they spend more 
time abroad and presumably weaken their ties with their host country. The second 
formulation of this hypothesis thinks about comparing different migrants, such as 
permanent and temporary migrants, and asks whether the types of migrants who remain 
in destination countries for longer periods of time are less likely to remit. While much of 
the literature has been motivated by the first question, the majority of studies have used a 
single cross-section to infer the relationship, making it more likely they are answering the 
second question. This is the approach we take too, given our data. Note that even with 19 
 
panel data which tracks the same migrants over time, the difficulties of dealing with non-
random return migration and with separating age, cohort and time effects makes the first 
question hard to answer. Of course if we assume that there are no cohort and time effects, 
and no selectivity of return migration, then the results of the cross-sectional estimation 
will address both questions. 
  Figure 6 examines how the extensive margin of whether or not individuals remit 
varies with years spent abroad. The relationship is non-linear, and robust to whether or 
not we control for years of education, sex, marital status and a quadratic in age as 
demographic controls. The vertical lines show that more than 75% of migrants in the 
sample have spent fewer than 10 years abroad – over this range, the propensity to remit 
increases with time spent abroad.  Beyond about 20 years spent abroad, however, the 
likelihood of remitting decreases sharply.  In contrast, when we examine the total amount 
remitted in Figure 7, there is little relationship with years spent abroad. Given Figure 6, 
this suggests that the lower tendency to remit after many years abroad is offset by 
individuals remitting more when they do remit.   Note that these results differ from Table 
3, where a quadratic in years abroad was always insignificant in predicting remittance 
behavior. Apart from the greater flexibility of functional form, the difference here is that 
we are not conditioning on income, work status, presence or not of family abroad, intent 
to return, or legal status. These are all variables which are likely to change with time 
spent abroad, so if we want to ask how time spent abroad is correlated with remittance 














These results therefore suggest that while there is something to the idea that 
migrants are less likely to remit as they spend more time abroad, this negative 
relationship only kicks in when migrants have been abroad twenty years or more – where 
we have fewer observations. The positive slope seen over the first 10 years, where the 
majority of our data is located, is consistent with some migrants taking some time to earn 
at a level which allows them to remit. Moreover, both of these patterns are offset by the 
intensive margin, resulting in a flat pattern with total amount remitted. As noted, it is 
possible that this pattern purely reflects selection differences arising from cohort effects 
in migration and selective return migration. But it seems unlikely to us that this would 
give such different patterns for the likelihood of remitting as compared to total remitted, 
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4.4 Remittance patterns by education 
The relationship between education and remittances is an important component in 
the debate over “brain drain” for African economies, and enters into the policy debate as 
to whether more low-skilled or more high-skilled job opportunities abroad are likely to 
result in more remittances. Of course maximizing remittances is in itself unlikely to be a 
sensible policy goal, and requires assuming large positive externalities from remittances 
through channels such as multiplier effects or financial development for what are 
otherwise private transfers between family members to have any role in policy decisions.
8 
Figures 8 and 9 present the non-parametric relationships between remittance 
patterns and years of education – with panel A in each case controlling only for dataset 
fixed effects and panel B also controlling for a quadratic in years abroad, sex, marital 
status, and a quadratic in age. In the baseline linear specification education was not 
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and intensive margins: more educated individuals were less likely to remit, but 
conditional on remitting, would remit more. This result is reaffirmed by the semi-
parametric regressions below.  Figure 7 shows that the likelihood of remitting is 
decreasing gradually in years of education.  Figure 8, however, shows that the intensive 
margin more than offsets this effect: average total remittances are remarkably constant up 
to a full high school education, and sharply increasing beyond this.  Thus while they 
remit less often, the highly educated remit more in total, with this driven by the tertiary 
educated. The main reason for the more educated remitting more is that they earn more, 
so that controlling for income and other controls in Table 3 results in an insignificant 
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4.5 Remittance patterns by income 
Finally, in Figures 10 and 11, we examine the relationship between remittance 
behavior and the (destination country) household income of the migrant. This is of 
interest both as a proxy for skill level, and directly, for examining whether richer 
migrants are less likely to remit than poorer migrants. We saw already that income is an 
important predictor of remittances in the baseline linear specifications in Table 3. Figure 
10 confirms this positive relationship between income and the probability of remitting for 
incomes less than $40,000, which accounts for more than 75 percent of the migrants in 
our database, and shows an imprecise somewhat downward trend after this. Again this is 
robust to whether or not we control linearly for individual characteristics (years of 
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Figure 11 shows that the overall positive relationship between total income and 
total amount remitted masks considerable non-linearity. The relationship is gradually 
rising over the interquartile range of incomes roughly between $10,000 and $30,000, and 
is sharply rising for incomes below and above this. This relationship differs somewhat 
from the extensive margin relationship in Figure 10. So for the poorest migrant 
households, they are only marginally less likely to remit than households earning 
$10,000-20,000, but remit a lot less. And households earning more than $40,000 are 
remitting amounts two to four times the African average amount remitted per year. If 
income is viewed as a reflection of skill, then this is again evidence that more-skilled 
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  It is thus notable that the pattern here with respect to income contrasts quite 
sharply with what we see with comparisons across countries. We have found African 
migrants remit more than migrants from other developing countries, with the average 
other developing country being richer than the average African country. And among 
African countries, we find migrants from richer countries are less likely to remit than 
migrants from poorer countries – although little relationship with total amount remitted. 
Yet among migrants from a given African country, migrants who earn more abroad are 
more likely to remit and remit more. One possible reason for this could be if there is little 
relationship between how much people earn abroad and the income level of the 
household members remaining in their home country, especially once we have 
conditioned on education. Another potential explanation involves temporary income 
shocks. Among migrants from a given source country, those who are experiencing high 
income in the current period because of a positive shock should be remitting more, 
whereas those who have low income because of a negative shock will remit less or not 
remit. This could explain the patterns seen in Figures 10 and 11. Once we aggregate 
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relationship between permanent income and remittances. We believe this is a fruitful area 
for further research which collects detailed information on shocks. 
5. Conclusions 
  Using a new database of over 12,000 African migrants we have provided a 
detailed analysis of which migrants remit and which don’t, and how remitting patterns 
vary with key variables such as gender, education, income, and time abroad. In doing so, 
we have refuted several common perceptions about remitting patterns. We find male 
migrants to remit more than female migrants, contrary to the perception that women are 
better remitters. We find the more educated and those earning higher incomes remit 
more, contrary to the belief that the high-skilled are less likely to remit than the lower 
skilled. And we find that the likelihood of remitting and the amount remitted increase 
over the first ten years of time abroad, contrary to fears of remittance decay, and that 
even with more time abroad, the drop in the likelihood of remitting with time abroad is 
offset by individuals remitting more when they do remit.  
  We consider this a reasonable start in overcoming the data limitations and 
information gaps that currently restrict understanding of remittance behavior of Africans. 
Nevertheless, it is but a start. The data we have is the most comprehensive currently 
available. Yet ideally one would like to extend the analysis to also include representative 
datasets on African migrants in major migrant destinations within Africa; to provide more 
detail on the circumstances of the household members remaining in the origin country; 
and to incorporate a panel data element that would enable study of how the behavior of 
the same particular migrants changes with time spent abroad and with shocks 
experienced. The household surveys which we use have the advantage of capturing 
informal transfers that are not recorded in official remittance flows. However, there are 
likely to be lingering concerns about the quality of the remittance figures being reported. 
We believe that migrants are less likely to underreport amounts remitted than might be 
the case in surveys in receiving countries, where household members might be concerned 
about tax and theft.
9 In future work it would be useful to extend the matched sample 
                                                        
9 Conversely, there is the possibility that migrants might be overreporting the amounts they remit, in order 
to make themselves look better in the eyes of the interviewer.  27 
 
approach of Osili (2007), by surveying both the remittance sender and recipient and 
comparing the remittance figures obtained to give a better sense of the accuracy of these 
reports.
10 
  Finally, the analysis in this paper is by necessity descriptive. Ideally one would 
like to directly link policy changes to changes in remittance behavior to more definitively 
answer the policy questions which motivate some of this paper. Thus, for example, as 
OECD countries change their migration policies, it is of interest to see whether changes 
in the gender, education, income level, and duration abroad of migrants induced by these 
policies lead to changes in remittance transfers. Likewise, one would like to know if 
policy actions to increase remittances, such as lowering remittance costs or setting up 
matching programs like Mexico’s 3 for 1 program, lead to more remittances. Regular 
surveys of remittances of Africans abroad would be one first step in creating the 
necessary data infrastructure needed to carry out such studies.  
                                                        
10 Osili (2007) notes that because migrants remit to multiple source country households and that source 
country receivers receive remittances from more than one migrant household abroad, she cannot directly 
compare the remittance figures on both side of a transaction. More detailed remittance questionnaires and 
careful attention to survey timing would allow this to be done. 28 
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Binary variable means      
University degree  0.39  0.53  0.08  0.18  0.17  0.10  0.06  0.14  0.03  0.26  0.34  0.33 
Male  0.61  0.69  0.64  0.49  0.88  0.63  0.56  0.62  0.82  0.54  0.50  0.62 
Working  0.61  0.67  0.77  0.40  0.80    0.19  0.56  0.78  0.82  0.52  0.61 
Married  0.66    0.70  0.64  0.61    0.50  0.60  0.63    0.64  0.64 
Spouse outside country  0.03        0.24    0.15  0.11  0.41    0.08  0.10 
Legal immigrant  1.00      1.00  0.85      0.58  0.67    1.00  0.86 
Will return home  0.04    0.47  0.06  0.42    0.00  0.03  0.35  0.76  0.16  0.17 
Years of education                
Mean  14.54  13.59  8.25  11.78  13.74  10.30  11.35  9.91  6.77  13.93  13.57  12.50 
Std deviation  3.61  4.14  4.89  2.86  4.28  4.23  4.21  3.88  5.86  2.20  4.73  4.64 
Age                
Mean  38.6  35.2  42.1  31.6  33.4  38.0  65.3  39.3  34.0  36.7  36.3  35.9 
Std deviation  12.8  9.4  11.4  9.0  6.4  10.7  7.8  14.7  8.1  9.7  12.1  11.3 
Household income ($                
Mean  10,608  21,929  23,495  19,915  11,407    22,900  15,438  9,114  45,658  38,170  26,344 
Std deviation  16,864  16,545  16,438  44,968  9,114    15,737  11,698  9,355  37,608  171,270  104,004 
Household size                
Mean  3.49  2.25    2.37  1.87    1.13  3.95  1.84  3.07  3.52  2.89 
Std deviation  1.64  1.66    1.78  1.24    0.34  2.09  1.48  1.56  1.83  1.83 
Number of children                
Mean  1.44      1.22  1.05    2.89  2.64  1.54    1.64  1.41 
Std deviation  1.51      1.65  1.28    2.03  1.70  1.99    2.30  1.71 
Children outside country                
Mean  0.22    0.09  0.31  0.67    0.21  0.29  1.07    0.56  0.32 
Std deviation  0.68    0.29  0.93  1.17    0.73  0.90  1.84    1.34  0.96 
Number of parents                
Mean  1.91        0.90    1.20  1.24  1.27    2.20  1.66 
Std deviation  1.38        0.94    0.72  0.79  0.85    1.28  1.21 
Parents outside country                
Mean  1.61    0.81    0.89    1.08  0.91  1.23    1.23  1.15 
Std deviation  1.29    0.39    0.94    0.76  0.85  0.86    0.83  0.97 
Years spent abroad                
Mean  3.63  10.95  18.24  3.85  6.77  16.44    16.10  7.25  12.21  6.70  9.37 
Std deviation  0.48  8.91  11.53  5.36  3.49  9.13    16.34  5.42  9.60  9.31  10.92 
                         
All Observations  358  472  560  4,424  1,160  522  304  2,494  1,113  586  763  12,481 
Note: All migrants born in Africa.  Sample weights post-stratified by country and education. 31 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Total Annual Remittances by Migrant Origin (%) 
 
  Sub‐Saharan Africa  North Africa  Rest of World 
Nothing  66.6  66.3  73.8 
$1 ‐ $200  4.3  0.9  3.6 
$200 ‐ $500  5.5  4.9  4.6 
$500 ‐ $1000  5.1  3.7  4.1 
$1000 ‐ $2000  5.8  7.7  5.1 
$2000 ‐ $5000  7.8  9.4  6.0 
$5000 ‐ $10,000  2.9  5.2  2.0 
$10,000 +  2.0  2.0  0.8 
Note: Each column sums to 100%.  Sample weights post-stratified by country and education.  Trimmed 




Table 3: Remittances on Migrant Characteristics and Country of 
Birth       
 
     
   Total Remittances  Extensive Margin:  Intensive Margin: 
         Remits or Not  Log remittances 
Years of education     19.7     0.005*     0.014 
      (19.9)     (0.002)     (0.007) 
Male     71.1     0.025     0.105 
      (389.7)     (0.015)     (0.082) 
Age / 100     3,657.5     0.588*     0.700 
      (5451.9)     (0.300)     (2.143) 
Age squared / 100     32.1     0.009**     0.011 
      (52.6)     (0.003)     (0.026) 
Log income     1,096.1*     0.034**     0.468** 
      (441.6)     (0.007)     (0.061) 
Working     775.2**     0.110**     0.410** 
      (275.9)     (0.017)     (0.110) 
Household size     12.6     0.010*     0.006 
      (110.6)     (0.005)     (0.029) 
Married     112.1     0.013     0.067 
      (385.3)     (0.018)     (0.100) 
Spouse outside country     1,339.3     0.170**     0.331* 
      (818.5)     (0.031)     (0.140) 
Number of children     232.3     0.000     0.112 
      (123.1)     (0.008)     (0.058) 
Children outside country     495.7**     0.046**     0.227** 
      (150.7)     (0.011)     (0.069) 
Number of parents     52.3     0.039*     0.113 
      (414.4)     (0.015)     (0.126) 
Parents outside country     35.2     0.079**     0.199 
      (320.3)     (0.016)     (0.117) 
Years spent abroad / 100     4,650.8     0.086     0.530 
      (5411.4)     (0.211)     (0.973) 
Years spent abroad squared / 
100 
   69.4     0.005     0.010 
      (72.3)     (0.004)     (0.022) 
Legal immigrant     197.2     0.119**     0.046 
      (259.0)     (0.025)     (0.090) 
Will return home     1,518.8     0.087**     0.002 
      (1242.1)     (0.029)     (0.100) 
Algeria  225.4  252.5  0.207**  0.094  0.092  0.072 
   (393)  (429)  (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.208)  (0.199) 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1,169.4  1,554.4  0.083  0.150*  0.362  0.168 
   (1280)  (1278)  (0.084)  (0.076)  (0.257)  (0.236) 
Egypt  615.3  250.6  0.263**  0.172**  0.304*  0.398** 
   (401)  (387)  (0.043)  (0.038)  (0.149)  (0.145) 
Ethiopia  2,909.3  2,359.1  0.068  0.031  0.105  0.098 
   (1869)  (1606)  (0.096)  (0.101)  (0.421)  (0.369) 
Morocco  11.9  660.9  0.160*  0.041  0.014  0.182 
   (400)  (440)  (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.167)  (0.161) 33 
 
Nigeria  1,935.9  1,715.1  0.006  0.014  0.039  0.082 
   (1521)  (1367)  (0.080)  (0.079)  (0.235)  (0.219) 
Senegal  994.6  783.7  0.125  0.117  0.089  0.013 
   (638)  (689)  (0.070)  (0.068)  (0.181)  (0.177) 
Somalia  450.3  570.9  0.063  0.124  0.050  0.146 
   (378)  (438)  (0.127)  (0.124)  (0.183)  (0.174) 
South Africa  805.0*  266.2  0.471**  0.392**  0.108  0.138 
   (349)  (377)  (0.069)  (0.068)  (0.340)  (0.297) 
NIS Other: Sub‐Saharan Africa  2,622.5  3,019.1  0.028  0.024  0.163  0.274 
   (2420)  (2458)  (0.093)  (0.094)  (0.580)  (0.493) 
Angola        0.179  0.080       
         (0.099)  (0.094)       
Cameroon        0.129  0.203*       
         (0.093)  (0.084)       
Comoros        0.003  0.141       
         (0.106)  (0.097)       
Congo, Rep.        0.027  0.055       
         (0.079)  (0.077)       
Cote d'Ivoire        0.051  0.110  0.594*  0.616** 
         (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.249)  (0.228) 
Guinea        0.055  0.059       
         (0.100)  (0.091)       
Madagascar        0.016  0.140       
         (0.104)  (0.099)       
Mali        0.131  0.200*  0.256  0.376 
         (0.094)  (0.088)  (0.274)  (0.249) 
Mauritania        0.197  0.211*       
         (0.118)  (0.095)       
Mauritius        0.282**  0.219**       
         (0.087)  (0.080)       
Togo        0.142  0.282       
         (0.141)  (0.153)       
Tunisia        0.129  0.016  0.387  0.258 
         (0.075)  (0.071)  (0.228)  (0.217) 
DREES Other: Rest of Africa        0.086  0.009       
         (0.099)  (0.101)       
BME Other: Africa              0.028  0.080 
               (0.319)  (0.304) 
                    
F‐stat for shown countries = 
Ghana 
2.88  1.59  15.45  8.45  2.21  2.24 
p‐value of F‐stat  0.001  0.103  0.000  0.000  0.006  0.005 
R
2   0.031  0.081  0.205  0.306  0.191  0.312 
R
2  with only survey fixed effects  0.018  0.018  0.136  0.136  0.153  0.153 
Number of observations  5,171  5,171  8,953  8,953  3,838  3,838 
 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  Omitted country is Ghana.  Fixed effects are included for all countries of 
birth, but only shown and tested if there are at least 30 observations.  All specifications also include survey 
fixed effects and dummy variables for missing covariates.  Sample weights post-stratified by country and 
education.  Trimmed remittances greater than twice annual income.  34 
 






















Observations  358  470  4,418  1,160  304  2,494  1,112  754  5,618 
Fraction male  0.61  0.69  0.49  0.88  0.56  0.62  0.82  0.51  0.64 
Fraction who 
remit 
                
Male  0.30  0.88  0.27  0.56  0.34  0.49  0.79  0.26  0.42 
Female  0.22  0.88  0.19**  0.60  0.18**  0.24**  0.70*  0.17*  0.26** 
Average total 
remittance 
                
Male  320  2,305   2,661   759  3,139  2,337  1,446 
Female  82**  1,714   2,207  283**  2,879  1,428  878 
               
Migrants with Spouse Outside Country 
Observations       301  32  266  455  78  1,020 
Fraction male       0.97  0.68  0.95  0.93  0.53  0.87 
Fraction who 
remit 
                
Male      0.73  0.69  0.85  0.94  0.42  0.77 
Female      0.49  0.20**  0.40**  0.77  0.05**  0.27** 
Average total 
remittance 
                
Male       4,080   1,753  4,011  3,842  3,879 
Female             728**   785  2,852*  42  771** 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  Showing all countries and statistics with at least 30 male or female 
observations.  Sample weights post-stratified by country and education.  Trimmed remittances greater than 











This paper combines household surveys from many countries, all with different samples 
and questions. This appendix outlines the actual remittance questions asked in each 
survey and how all variables used in the paper were coded. 
 
General rules 
 Financial variables are annualized, converted to US dollars using nominal 
exchange rates from the Penn World Table, then deflated with the CPI to 2003 
levels. 
 To interpolate information provided only in binned categories, we infer:  
  Years of education as the midpoints of the schooling ranges  
  Financial values as the geometric midpoints of the money ranges  
  An upper bound on the highest category of twice level of the lower bound 
on this category  
  “Don’t know” is coded as missing. For example, about one-third of the “Will 
return home” indicator values are missing for this reason.  
  We trim all reported remittances greater than twice annual (positive) income 
 
Sample weights 
We always use the sampling weights provided with each survey dataset. When pooling 
the datasets we start with these, and then re-scale the weights in three steps to allow 
comparisons across surveys, eventually using weights post-stratified by education and 
country of birth in our baseline results: 
1. Weight each survey in proportion to its sample size. The weights in each 
survey were rescaled to sum to the number of observations of developing country 
migrants in that survey. 
2. Post-stratify by education and continent of origin. After weighting each 
survey in proportion to its sample size, the surveys were pooled and divided into 
cells continents of birth and by whether the respondent had a university degree. 
The weights in each cell were then rescaled to sum to the total number of 
developing country migrants in OECD countries in this cell in the year 2000, from 
the Brain Drain database (Docquier and Marfouk 2005). Migrants in the Brain 
Drain database of unknown education were assigned an educational attainment in 
proportion to that of their compatriots so that country totals and relative skill 
fractions remained accurate. 
3.  Post-stratify by education and country of origin. After constructing the 
continental post-stratified weights, we calculate aggregate sample weights for 
each country in the continent as the sum across surveys of weights of observations 
of known countries, and of shares of weights of observations of groupings of 
unknown countries in the continent (eg, “Other Africa”), where the shares of each 
country within the grouping are calculated from the Brain Drain database. These 
aggregate sample weights are then re-scaled to the number of migrants in this 
country-by-education cell in the Brain Drain database. Finally, these total re-36 
 
scaled weights are re-apportioned to the (sometimes survey-specific) country 
codes following the reverse procedure (ie, using shares from the Pooled data). In 
this way, we create weighting cells that, for each survey, partition each continent-








































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 1: Summary of Datasets        





































































































































































Pooled                   
Africa  10,595  0.33  2,638  1,088  1,263  0.10 
Rest of World  20,610  0.29**  2,427  1,088  668**  0.04** 
North Africa  2,627  0.29**  2,313  1,214  1,123  0.13** 
Sub‐Saharan Africa  3,003  0.37**  2,926  1,054  1,372  0.08** 
Algeria  184  0.15**  1,138**  859  309**  0.03** 
Congo, Dem Rep  139  0.72**  1,764**  900  1,650  0.12 
Egypt  569  0.39*  6,234**  5,047  2,180**  0.18** 
Ethiopia  239  0.25  1,513*  920  347**  0.06* 
Ghana  710  0.66**  3,614*  1,757  2,832**  0.22** 
Morocco  1,860  0.38**  2,641  1,644  1,269  0.15** 
Nigeria  408  0.56**  5,015  1,088  3,677  0.08 
Senegal  721  0.85**  3,371**  2,548  3,149**  0.41** 
Somalia  37  0.26*  1,082**  792  540**    45 
 
South Africa  111  0.09**  1,607**  751  157**  0.01** 
Australia LSIA                   
Africa  358  0.27  848  333  227  0.02 
Rest of World  2,316  0.41**  789  347  323  0.03** 
North Africa  64  0.27        173  0.01* 
Sub‐Saharan Africa  294  0.27  892  295  238  0.02* 
Egypt  56  0.24        187    
Ethiopia  37  0.60**        590*    
Somalia  43  0.55**        467    
South Africa  106  0.11**        166  0.01 
Belgium IRSHS                   
Africa  472  0.88  2,520  1,218  2,117  0.12 
Sub‐Saharan Africa  472  0.88  2,520  1,218  2,117  0.12 
Congo, Dem Rep  154  0.98**  1,900*  949  1,838  0.12 
Nigeria  163  0.75**  2,367  937  1,749  0.07** 
Senegal  155  0.92  3,458**  2,577  2,917**  0.17** 
France 2MO                   
Africa  560     1,341  859       
Rest of World  157     1,608*  859       
North Africa  395     1,316  859       
Sub‐Saharan Africa  165     1,401  859       
Algeria  126     1,079**  859       
Côte d'Ivoire  31     1,539  859       
Mali  36     1,600  859       
Morocco  131     1,283  859       
Senegal  41     1,517  859       
Tunisia  137     1,566*  859       46 
 
France DREES                   
Africa  4,424  0.23             
Rest of World  1,742  0.24             
North Africa  2,826  0.16**             
Sub‐Saharan Africa  1,598  0.35**             
Algeria  1,447  0.12**             
Angola  39  0.09**             
Cameroon  218  0.37**             
Comoros  90  0.41**             
Congo, Dem Rep  64  0.22             
Congo, Rep  291  0.30*             
Côte d'Ivoire  234  0.41**             
Egypt  44  0.17             
Guinea  90  0.28             
Madagascar  71  0.38*             
Mali  115  0.37**             
Mauritania  53  0.48**             
Morocco  791  0.17**             
Senegal  145  0.35*             
Togo  47  0.48*             
Tunisia  432  0.24             
Italy NIDI                   
Africa  1,160  0.56  4,982  3,028  2,606  0.22 
North Africa  502  0.43**  6,839**  6,056  2,583  0.20 
Sub‐Saharan Africa  658  0.66**  4,136**  2,826  2,623  0.23 
Egypt  502  0.43**  6,839**  6,056  2,583  0.20 
Ghana  658  0.66**  4,136**  2,826  2,623  0.23 47 
 
Netherlands CSR                   
Africa  522     1,139  703       
Rest of World  314     871**  586       
North Africa  176     964*  703       
Sub‐Saharan Africa  346     1,236*  879       
Ghana  192     1,435**  937       
Morocco  176     964*  703       
Somalia  154     936**  586       
Norway LKI                   
Africa  304  0.27             
Rest of World  2,162  0.35*             
Sub‐Saharan Africa  304  0.27             
Somalia  302  0.27**             
Spain ENI                   
Africa  2,494  0.40  1,746  1,214  572  0.07 
Rest of World  8,926  0.48**  2,394**  1,457  1,009**  0.10** 
North Africa  2,075  0.35**  1,690  1,214  494**  0.06* 
Sub‐Saharan Africa  419  0.63**  1,914  1,336  982**  0.10* 
Algeria  203  0.27**  1,330*  1,214  300**  0.03** 
Gambia, The  40  0.72**        841    
Ghana  42  0.78**        1,210*    
Mali  34  0.71**             
Morocco  1,850  0.36**  1,695  1,214  513*  0.06 
Nigeria  72  0.78**        1,437*  0.09 
Senegal  72  0.78**  1,751  1,457  1,131**    
Spain NIDI                   
Africa  1,113  0.77  4,121  3,522  3,089  0.39 48 
 
North Africa  598  0.64**  4,736**  4,227  2,915  0.29** 
Sub‐Saharan Africa  515  0.93**  3,616**  2,818  3,302  0.50** 
Morocco  598  0.64**  4,736**  4,227  2,915  0.29** 
Senegal  515  0.93**  3,616**  2,818  3,302  0.50** 
UK BME                   
Africa  586     2,570  920       
Rest of World  645     2,814  920       
Sub‐Saharan Africa  574     2,539  920       
Ghana  70     2,913  920       
Nigeria  267     2,989  1,088       
USA NIS                   
Africa  763  0.22  9,100  1,200  1,887  0.05 
Rest of World  6,591  0.15**  3,641  1,500  530  0.02** 
Sub‐Saharan Africa  763  0.22  9,100  1,200  1,887  0.05 
Ethiopia  199  0.15        138*  0.05 
Nigeria  173  0.23  22,069  1,200  4,874  0.08 
note:  ** p<0.01, * p<0.05                
Differences in means are calculated relative to rest of Africa          
Beware that samples may differ by column             
Showing all countries and statistics with 30+ observations          
Trimmed remittances greater than twice income             
 